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Abstract 
After describing briefly the activities of information officers in the 
early decades of British security services MI5 and the Secret Intel-
ligence Service (SIS, otherwise known as MI6), the work of these 
documentalists is thereafter explored in the wider context of the 
information manager in the knowledge organization. Early in the 
twentieth century, MI5 created its Registry to ensure the efficient 
use of the information it gathered on suspect aliens. Its equivalent in 
SIS, housed in Room 40 Admiralty Old Building, was concerned with 
signals intercepted first on cables and later transmitted by wireless. 
The Second World War saw similar operations, including those of 
the London Reception Centre (LRC) and of the Government Code 
& Cypher School (GCCS) in Bletchley Park. This paper describes 
briefly the means by which the intelligence could be put to efficient 
use to provide effective and efficient support to their customers, 
the “spycatchers,” “the watch,” and the researchers, or “back room.”
Introduction
While British military history can supply us with many illustrations of the 
role that intelligence might play in both strategic and operational deci-
sion making, it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that there 
was a formalization of this aspect of military planning and resources. The 
War Office established its Intelligence Branch in 1873; but it was not until 
1887 that the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) emerged as a 
major organization in the military establishment (Herman, 1996, p. 17). 
The documentation of intelligence, of course, has a long history. In more 
recent times we find, for instance, that one of the participants in the sec-
ond annual meeting of the Library Association of the United Kingdom, 
Manchester, September, 1879, was Captain George Grover of the Intelli-
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gence Department, War Office (Tedder and Thomas, 1880, p. 159). Later 
the intelligence services, both internal and external, were to undergo 
massive expansion, and with that expansion came the need for manage-
ment, not only in organizational terms but also of the raw materials. In-
telligence, of course, means information; and what emerged from the pe-
riod just preceding the First World War was the application of various 
information management techniques to control the vast amounts of the 
raw material generated as a result of the formalization of the intelligence 
gathering process. Information management needs information manag-
ers and, while the term was to take some time in its coining, these manag-
ers were among the forerunners of the information officers of today. This 
paper explores the functions and activities of the information managers, 
or documentalists, of the British security services MI5 and the Secret In-
telligence Service (SIS, otherwise known as MI6) in the wider context of 
the information officer in the knowledge organization of the first half of 
the twentieth century.1
Background
The history of the establishment of the British intelligence services is now 
well documented (West, 1981; West, 1986; Andrew, 2009: Jeffery, 2010) 
and the exploits of the different sections and departments in counter espi-
onage and information gathering and analysis have been extensively cov-
ered over the past twenty years or so. What have been less fully explored 
are the information management aspects of their operations, which were 
concerned with the organization and retrieval of the intelligence gath-
ered by techniques ranging from stealing documents, to eavesdropping 
on conversation (human intelligence, often contracted to HUMINT), to in-
tercepting wireless signals (signals intelligence, often contracted to SIGINT).
In keeping with their functions, these organizations accumulated pro-
digious quantities of intelligence from a wide range of sources—informa-
tion that could be controlled and made useful only by means of informa-
tion management techniques such as indexing. In their introduction to 
Codebreakers, Hinsley and Stripp (1993, p. 12) observe that Ultra short-
ened the Second World War by two years.2 It would perhaps be more accu-
rate (and just) to say that it was the documentation of the intelligence that 
was responsible for that shortening, for pure intelligence out of context and 
unrelated is valueless. Three establishments—the Central Registry of MI5, 
the Information Section of the London Reception Centre (LRC), and the 
Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS)—provide useful exemplars.3 
The Central Registry of MI5 was set up soon after the bureau was first 
established in 1909. Part of its brief was to ensure that “all Names, Places, 
and Subjects mentioned in the documents should be minutely indexed”4 
to allow action to be “based on a knowledge of all the available facts, a 
knowledge which is to be obtained by consulting all relevant documents.”5 
362 library trends/fall 2013
By the end of the First World War, a highly efficient and well-organized 
machine had been created under Captain Vernon Kell, the army inter-
preter and bureaucrat who had directed MI5 since its inception; and the 
potential for continuing development on the basis of lessons learned was 
considerable. However, improvements recommended in the historical 
reports were not introduced; rather, the War Office allowed the Regis-
try to become moribund, starved of status and resources. It is hardly sur-
prising that under the pressure of renewed hostilities in 1939, the system 
crashed. According to the official internal history of the Security Service,6 
the Central Index “had been allowed to lapse into a lamentable state,” a 
degeneration which included misplaced cards, a great lack of guide cards, 
and overfull cabinets. The necessary reorganization of MI5’s information 
commenced in July 1940 when Reginald Horrocks, a specialist in business 
methods, was recruited from Roneo (but, it appears, no indexers, librari-
ans, or documentalists). Opportunity was taken to work on the document 
files and the index, weeding, consolidating, and improving consistency. 
By end of the war, the very much more efficient Registry incorporated an 
index of over one and a quarter million entries.
The London Reception Centre (LRC) had been opened to handle 
large numbers of alien refugees flooding into Britain from occupied Eu-
rope. To facilitate confirmation of their bona fides, in 1942 the Centre’s 
Information Section established its Information Index, which came to 
contain a great variety of relevant material about the countries from which 
they arrived along with details of methods and routes used by enemy agents 
or members of allied resistance movements. The Index was in two sepa-
rate parts: the Name Index and the Geographical Index, and eventually 
contained some 100,000 cards.7 The LRC Information Section and par-
ticularly the Information Index were the only point at which information 
from MI5, SIS, and Special Operations Executive (SOE) and numerous 
other sources was recorded and collated for the benefit of MI5. As a result 
other organizations also made use of it, such as MI5 head office sections, 
SOE, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).
Soon after the establishment of GCCS at Bletchley Park, it became 
plain that arrangements would have to be put in place to exploit fully the 
intelligence it was obtaining from breaking Enigma.8 The lead was taken 
by Winterbotham (chief air intelligence officer of SIS), Welchman (a 
mathematician in Trinity College, Cambridge, recruited on the eve of war 
to reinforce the decrypting resources), Travis (deputy head of GCCS), 
and others who together quickly came to appreciate the need to record 
and index the information (Welchman, 1982, pp. 93–94).
 Unlike intelligence gathered from more conventional sources such 
as observation and captured documents, which might be said to have a 
degree of context into which the information might be placed, SIGINT 
arrived as disembodied strings of letters. Very often the decrypts, while 
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having the appearance of being clear messages in a recognizable lan-
guage, turned out to be constructed from jargon and contractions, and 
were highly specific to the knowledge and experience of the sender and 
intended recipient(s). Unless these nonconversational German messages 
could be clarified, their sharing with allied commanders in the field could 
range in effect from useless to dangerous.
To this end, various recording and documentation facilities were es-
tablished by the units that were directly involved in the exploitation of 
decrypted signals. Of these the principal units were Air Intelligence (3A), 
Military Intelligence (3M), and General Intelligence (3G), all located in 
Hut 3; and Naval Intelligence located in Hut 4.9 The documentation of 
the intelligence effectively took two forms: factual indexes that recorded 
details relating to specific topics (such as military equipment, locations, 
formations) and individuals; and reference indexes that could be used 
to translate, clarify, explain, and conceptualize words, abbreviations, ac-
ronyms, and arbitrary strings of characters, that emerged in the decrypts 
(Brunt, 2004). 
In addition were to be found indexes maintained by specialist research 
or “back room” parties such as those concerned with railways, field post 
offices, secret weapons, and technological developments (such as radar, 
directional beams, V-weapons). Traffic analysis also involved much index-
ing (of call signs, for instance). 
The Hypothesis
Stated briefly, the central hypothesis of this paper is that the intelligence 
officers in these organizations were in effect information officers, carry-
ing out the whole range of activities associated with the management of 
information to ensure efficient and effective exploitation in furthering 
the aims and objectives of their parent organizations.10 However, this hy-
pothesis demands elaboration, since it is full of generalities, and in or-
der to begin to argue the case, we need to be sure of the terms used in 
its expression. What do we mean by “intelligence officer”? Perhaps the 
popular view is conveyed in the books of the Dutch counter-intelligence 
officer Lieutenant-Colonel Oreste Pinto—Spycatcher (1952), Friend and 
Foe (1952), Spycatcher 2 (1960)—which portray a character who gradu-
ally assembles the evidence to break the suspect, and having presented 
it in the form of an Agatha Christie denouement, forces the suspect to 
come clean. Perhaps he is the diligent cryptanalyst who cracks the code, 
as in the case of Nigel de Grey of British intelligence (who, with Wil-
liam Montgomery, deciphered the Zimmermann Telegram, helping to 
bring the United States into the First World War); or the insubordinate 
Harry Palmer, portrayed in Len Deighton’s book The Ipcress File (1962); 
or Leamas, in John le Carré’s 1963 novel The Spy Who Came in from the 
Cold.11 All these depictions, whether based on truth or vivid imagination, 
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invariably omit the image suggested by the (now released) archive papers 
describing the work of MI5, SIS, and GCCS, which conjures up a much 
more prosaic, mundane existence than the exhilaration of the need to 
avoid the pursuing enemy authorities; but one no less frenetic because of 
the pressure of the amounts of intelligence, the race against time, and the 
need to overcome the barrier of the less than convivial surroundings in 
which the work took place.12
Some of the intelligence officers here do, indeed, reflect the sort of 
work portrayed in Spycatcher, such as those in MI5 and LRC;13 but along-
side these were to be found the registry clerks and the intelligence of-
ficers’ secretaries who turned out to be those providing the very solid 
foundations upon which the spy catcher could place his (and it was al-
ways “his”) confidence that the necessary incriminating evidence would 
be available, reliable, and complete. In the work at Bletchley Park, the 
intelligence clerks proved to be the very dependable category of workers 
who ensured that the documentation was complete; and the vital connec-
tions of seemingly disconnected commonplaces and disparate snippets of 
information could be established and allow the fuller picture to emerge. 
All this, of course, is not to detract from the work of the commissioned 
intelligence officer who had the responsibilities associated with the priori-
tization and categorization and ultimate use of the intelligence. 
All staff—commissioned, NCO, or civilian—dealt in, and with, infor-
mation, be it material of immediate and crucial operational importance, 
which had to reach commands post haste, or intelligence of longer term 
potential, such as that associated with railway movements that, in conjunc-
tion with order of battle (OB) information,14 could indicate the move-
ment of a formation and a possible massing of forces for a new campaign. 
All was based on a solid foundation borne out of meticulous, accurate, 
painstaking work.
Looking at the phrase “management of information,” we may define it 
as would any text on library and information science, documentation, or 
abstracting and indexing (Lancaster, 1998, pp. 1–4). Librarians of course 
have been managing information for millennia (Casson, 2001), but with 
the emergence of developed economies came the need for expansion 
and increased sophistication in the tools and systems used. Thus were 
developed bibliographic standards, thus secondary publications, thus the 
provision of special intelligence arrangements in industrial and commer-
cial concerns (Barbour, 1921) and research institutions.
And so, to repeat the hypothesis in the specific context: intelligence 
staff of all ranks and categories in the likes of MI5, SIS, and GCCS were 
engaged in the tasks now accepted as belonging to the corporate informa-
tion officer: obtaining intelligence, organizing it for retrieval, displaying 
relationships, extracting the useful kernel, and transmitting it to custom-
ers, or users, for direct action based on it.
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The Evidence
If the hypothesis is to be accepted as proved, it must be clear that the work 
of the intelligence organization fits in with that now accepted as the work 
of the information officer. The approach will be to look at the following 
aspects, drawing on the experiences of the intelligence officers in differ-






Information handled and material forms
The nature of the information to be handled has a bearing on the pro-
cesses devised and implemented in each case. While it might at first be 
assumed that the data gathered for internal security (MI5, LRC) would 
be essentially personal (which indeed was where the business started, 
given the concern for spies), it soon emerged that intelligence personnel 
would have to contend with “subject” data; and, as it turned out, these 
data could span the entire universe of knowledge. There could be no ex-
clusion of facts and details of the most minute and diverse kinds, since 
anything could influence the progress of a case and provide evidence for 
conviction.
The reverse is true when we consider the SIS side of the picture. Where 
interception of SIGINT could rightly be regarded as being focused on 
nonpersonal data such as OB, supplies, strengths, movements, and mo-
rale, it soon emerged that the details about a single individual could indi-
cate something crucial about his or her unit or the establishment of a new 
organization. These types of information throw up a number of different 
indexing problems, and these are exacerbated by the nature of the infor-
mation’s acquisition and the fact of their very ordinariness.
One of the principles on which the work was based was the need to in-
dex the common in addition to the uncommon, on the assumption (and 
the experience of the unit, Naval Section VI, Technical Intelligence) that 
it was impossible to recognize the unusual without the reference marks 
provided by the ordinary. This reflects practice in the LRC Information 
Index of carding “the sheep and the goats,”15 and Jones’s (1990) inclusion 
of the obvious and the obscure.16 An example is the commonplace abbre-
viation “ggf” (gegebenfalls, i.e., “if need be”). This cropped up everywhere 
and was included in the file (assumed to denote some piece of equip-
ment) until its true significance was appreciated.17
Unlike the work of libraries, where author (as personal) information 
could be tied neatly to context and data linked to other bibliographic and 
biographical machinery, the “authorship” of intelligence can be obscure 
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(purposefully or otherwise) and the subjects of the “biographies” uncertain 
even as to their existence, let alone the veracity of the claims about them. 
Subjects (i.e., factual data) might be more easily handled in that informa-
tion about a weapon or a formation relates to tangibles; but as the early ex-
perimentation with subject catalogues showed, it is difficult to establish uni-
versal headings or even generally acceptable methods to ensure efficiency 
(and consistency) in handling and retrieval (Brunt, 2006a, p. 580). It fell 
therefore to the staff of these organizations to devise their own methods 
and develop them to meet changing circumstances as different and new 
types of information presented itself. What else were they doing, there-
fore, but acting as information scientists and information officers?
Processes, problems, remedies
Processes. The creation of the MI5 Registry involved first the making 
of files for every suspect after which the Personal File and Subject File 
sections were responsible for the indexing of every paper that came into 
the Bureau from whatever source. Indexing machinery to facilitate look-up 
“had been evolved as the occasion arose.”18 When MI5 first started, “there 
were comparatively so few files that they were known individually to the 
staff, who found no inconvenience in the fact that there were two files un-
der the name ‘Smith’ (no Christian name) one being described as Smith 
of Norwich and the other Smith of Amsterdam.”19 This soon proved un-
workable, as the amounts of intelligence expanded. Remedies were thus 
sought resulting in revised procedures described below. It is interesting to 
note the observation that what evolved “was possibly more cumbersome 
[sic] than if a scheme had been formulated early in the war to embrace 
all the unforeseen contingencies which afterwards occurred.”20 A greater 
awareness of library and other indexing methods might have inspired 
such a scheme.
In the LRC the Name Index and the Geographical Index comprised 
the Information Index. The former was a single sequence of cards, each 
containing the full name and all relevant details regarding history and 
circumstances, and the latter, a more complex index, was arranged first 
by countries with each country subarranged by addresses, towns, and sub-
jects. Every entry on each card referred to a source, much in the same way 
as in an abstracting publication. Officers in charge of investigations were 
responsible for marking their reports for “carding,” i.e., indexing. How-
ever, considerable discretion was left to the “carders” themselves. Index-
ing policy was plainly driven by the use made of the Information Index. 
The Index was principally used by staff for checking names on arrivals 
lists and as part of report writing, with officers visiting with their notes to 
check details before writing up.21 
At Bletchley Park, as each message was translated and its contents 
used, it was passed to the indexing watch, which identified the words and 
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phrases to be indexed. All the details to be indexed were underlined in 
red, and before the cards were written, the work was checked by the head 
of the Index who would supplement, or draw attention to, unnecessary or 
inaccurate work. In Hut 3, for instance, the Air Index had five main sec-
tions: Units, Locations, Personalities, Equipment, and General Subjects; 
the Military Index had six. According to Calvocoressi (1981, p. 73), the 
list of interesting details was endless, as might have been expected in a 
process that was indexing, in effect, the entire universe of military knowl-
edge and much else. 
Problems. In MI5, difficulties were ascribed principally to the some-
times fragile methods of acquisition (over the telephone; from illiterate 
informants; from partially overheard conversations). Two great problems 
were identified: first, the determination of the correct forms of the names 
in the information, so that they might be properly indexed; second, the 
recognition of the same names should they again be brought to the no-
tice of the Bureau, so that they might be correctly “looked-up.” These 
were exacerbated by the need to handle names in a number of languages. 
Many examples are given, including, for example, seventy-three variations 
of Smith or Schmidt; forty-eight possible spellings for Eriksen, fourteen 
of them having occurred.22 These, of course, are the classic problems ad-
dressed by cataloguing codes—but the indexers were not dealing with 
names conveniently presented on title pages but supplied by many differ-
ent sources of variable quality. 
 Frequently, investigations depended on “the tracing of a connection 
between isolated scraps of information;” yet this information was often 
“very meagre and of doubtful authenticity.”23 Names passed to MI5 were 
not always accurate, a grotesque example being the recording of “Toe-
knee-oh” as a suspect who eventually turned out to be called “Antonio.”24
 Other problems were remarkably similar to those that confront librar-
ians and bibliographers. A standing rule was that surnames should be 
spelled in upper case, and Christian names in lower case. It was acknowl-
edged, however, that “even this rule breaks down when one is dealing with 
oriental, or other, peoples among whom the European system of nomen-
clature does not prevail;” and so to help solve this problem, at “examina-
tion posts” (such as permit offices), certain classes of people were asked 
to sign their names in native and in Roman characters.
The LRC Index would have suffered the same sorts of problems re-
garding names found in MI5; but the great complexity of the Geographi-
cal sequences opened it up to all sorts of additional dangers of misfiling 
and duplication. The Address Index was first sorted by towns in alphabeti-
cal order, then by further location devices such as telephone numbers, 
PO Box numbers, streets in alphabetical order, hotels, and restaurants. 
Subject Index material was assigned to broad areas such as Organiza-
tions, Intelligence Services, Authorities, and Welfare organizations.25 
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Each of these categories covered several subcategories; e.g., organizations 
included pro-allied organizations, resistance movements, escape routes, 
Communist Party, and passwords. They seemed not to be subject head-
ings in the conventional indexing sense but guidance on what should be 
indexed. Thus while “Resistance movements” appears as a category, the 
heading on the card itself was “Resistance organisations.” This of course 
opened up dangers of inconsistency.
At Bletchley Park the major problems resulted from the great and 
unexpected successes in breaking Enigma. This produced overwhelm-
ing quantities of information and thus increased the speed at which the 
analytical work had to be done. The Air Index grew from four inches of 
cards in a shoe box in mid-1941 to a room full of trays and special racks 
containing half a million cards by the end of hostilities, each card hold-
ing several “entries” or abstracts of intercepted messages. As a result there 
could be scatter of related material until some message drew together dif-
ferent cards that related to the same topic. For instance, the city of Zagreb 
was treated in the Military Index for some time as being different from 
Agram.26 The problem of the occurrence of the same character string in 
different contexts was also recognized and addressed (e.g., “TAURUS” 
might be a covername, a type of aircraft, or a detachment, and the term 
would appear in all the appropriate sequences).27 
Remedies. As the accession rates in MI5 grew to two thousand new files 
per month, procedures were tightened up, and by 1914 some codifica-
tion of practice was established. A document published internally as Office 
instructions was “intended to give such information regarding the registra-
tion, filing and indexing as will enable new members of the staff . . . to 
obtain a general idea of the mechanism at their disposal.”28 In 1918 the 
practice of indexing the various spellings of a name under its most com-
mon form was established. Thus the entry for “SCHMIDT. Johann” would 
be a reference to “SMITH,” and “Johann Schmidt” would be found in the 
“SMITH” sequence.29 
While this approach is effective and efficient in closed systems such 
as union catalogues and the Registry, it is not so convenient for the non-
experienced, and this perhaps explains why intelligence officers generally 
left consultation to the Registry staff rather than doing it themselves.30 
During the Second World War, a similar and more specific manual was 
issued, which had the appearance of the sort of codification found in li-
braries. Included in the file “Arrangements of Security Service Central 
Indexes including carding and amending procedures” is a series of docu-
ments (each headed “Registry Instruction . . .”) that relate to the prepa-
ration of index cards.31 Accompanying “Registry Instruction no. 72” is a 
chart “issued with the object of ensuring the greatest degree of uniformity 
in the placing of material upon Index cards and in the actual arrange-
ment of the typescript.” On the chart are illustrative examples of the han-
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dling of personal names and other details; and instructions for indexing 
information about corporate bodies such as firms, societies, and ships. 
Other documents in the file refer specifically to the problems of handling 
Spanish names along with exhortations that indexers pay particular atten-
tion to their forms and filing conventions. There is, however, little by way 
of guidance on authority control to indicate, for instance, the forms in 
which, say, escape routes, fishing regulations, or labour conditions might 
be prescribed as terms for headings.
In the Air Index at Bletchley Park, a continuity book was maintained 
that recorded, among other aspects of the work, decisions on indexing 
procedures. Its counterparts were to be found in the log book of the 
Military Index and the diaries maintained in the Naval Section records 
parties. However, the sorts of authority-control devices common in librar-
ies (such as inverted files of references and subject indexes) were not in 
place; the functions of these being, in effect, discharged by the very char-
acteristics of the organizations such as the closed systems, apprenticeship 
training, ready sharing of problems, and, in MI5, feminine qualities.32 
Solutions were the results of continuous reaction to problems as they 
presented themselves; the remedies were found on the hoof and were 
reflective of the early days of library catalogue codification and the case-
based—as opposed to the post-Lubetzky principles—approach (Brunt, 
2006a). The indexes were in constant flux, with segments being moved or 
hived off as exigencies demanded (e.g., the abbreviations sequence in the 
Air Index was relocated in the Abbreviations Index maintained by Jones 
in 3G) (Brunt, 2006b).
These are all the functions of information officers, not only in the doc-
umentation processes but also in the development of procedures, experi-
mentation, and the working of vocabulary control.33 The main difference 
from civilian practice lies in the lack of stability—where conventional in-
formation officers could enjoy the luxury of the long-term view and little 
chance of catastrophic change in materials or change in direction, the 
pressures of work under war conditions meant that changes not only had 
to be appropriate and effective but also taken at pace in order to meet the 
needs of their customers operating under perhaps even greater pressures 
on the watch and at the front. 
Customer service
While the customers of MI5 and LRC were case officers essentially assem-
bling information to support decision making regarding spies and sabo-
teurs, or the bona fides of refugees and others landing at ports, those in 
Bletchley Park represented a very much wider range of clientele. GCCS 
staff discharged many responsibilities, ranging from the elucidation of 
messages of extreme urgency that had to be paraphrased accurately prior 
to dispatch to commands, to the relatively long-term project aimed, for 
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instance, at assessing new secret weapons that might pose threats some 
months into the future.
Customers in MI5 included the registry clerks themselves who did the 
“looking-up” for the intelligence officer to locate the set of files relevant 
to the case in hand, which might include material about other personali-
ties or subjects referred to such as equipment or routes. MI5 papers also 
mention the vital work done by intelligence officers’ secretaries who at 
times could be expected to deputize for their officers, and it is fair to 
infer that this group of workers too were customers of the Index and the 
registry clerks. LRC Information Index was used by both the indexers on 
behalf of the officers and the officers themselves, possibly an indication 
that the Index was easy to use. This contrasts with the observation that 
in the First World War intelligence officers tended to lack confidence in 
such use, and this enhanced the role of the clerks.34 It is not clear whether 
things improved in the Registry during the Second World War to enable 
intelligence officers to make direct use, or whether these officers were 
more competent than their First World War counterparts.
The wide variety of indexes was available to, and in constant and rigor-
ous use by, different groups of staff in GCCS: the indexers themselves, 
the translators and emenders of the decodes, and the “advisers” who were 
responsible for creating and dispatching what would have been the es-
sence of each enemy signal to the appropriate command. Researchers 
(often referred to as “back room”) who were working on specific projects 
concerned with more elaborate and in-depth analysis also made great use 
of the indexes. In this they were used to spot trends, to paint the wider 
picture of enemy developments and movements, and to illuminate and 
explain obscure data that might or might not have a bearing on the war 
effort. For instance, Professor Norman acted almost as Dr. Jones’s per-
sonal researcher looking for references to technical developments and se-
cret weapons. Indexers in the Air Index were asked specifically to ensure 
that any intercept referring to Peenemunde35 go to Norman directly.36
The relationship between the documentation staff and their intelli-
gence officer customers was different in many ways from that which existed 
in civilian information bureaux and libraries, principally in the fact that the 
customers were not external to the information system. Close relationships 
generated by war, esprit de corps, and democratization—the shop girls 
dressed like the debs (Sieff, 1988, p. 233, cited in Hennessy, 2007; How-
ard, 1987)—and the sharing of the same harsh conditions and emotional 
and other stresses, meant that there was a much more intimate relation-
ship between provider and customer. In the Military Index, “each indexer 
marked and indexed at her own discretion,” and “a large amount of dis-
cretion on the part of each indexer was inevitable and encouraged.”37
There was an expectation that the registry clerks and the intelligence 
clerks would offer opinions, based on their knowledge of the indexes, 
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to those involved in the decision-making and executive processes;38 and 
it was observed that “a good indexer had the qualities of an intelligence 
officer in that the capacity to spot and remember detail and make con-
nections was vital to the effectiveness of the work.”39 In this respect they 
were customers of their own businesses since they were also charged with 
developing an expertise in specific topics and subjects with a view to being 
able to give more substantial support than merely finding the right card: 
“each indexer became an expert in her own particular sphere.”40 
Recruitment and training
In the First World War, the MI5 officer was often a man invalided out from 
the front; there is evidence of the recruitment for the duration on service 
commissions from the knowledge industries such as librarianship, the law, 
and the universities (Jones, 1990, p. 115). Registry clerks were essentially 
socially well-placed women, many of whom were university trained.41 
Second World War service intelligence officers were recruited from 
academic and civilian backgrounds (Erskine, 1986) and given nominal 
ranks; they included the likes of Pilot Officer Cullingham who never saw 
a cockpit and Cdr. Tandy who never stood on a warship’s bridge. Women, 
principally linguists and often graduates or university trained,42 made the 
bulk of the Bletchley Park intelligence units staff; they included the re-
spectable society types who had been “finished” in Germany and Austria 
and so had fluent German.
Training was by apprenticeship to the most experienced officers, and 
in the Air Index it was expected that trainees would become independent 
in four to six weeks, though it would take many more months for them 
to become fully fledged.43 In this there was probably not a lot of differ-
ence from contemporaneous library and information bureau training. 
There were very few opportunities for formal training (there was only 
one library school in the UK, at University College London) and profes-
sional qualifications of the Library Association would have been gained by 
correspondence augmented by knowledge gained on the job, from “sit-
ting next to Nellie.” The Association of Special Libraries and Information 
Bureaux (Aslib) was formed in 1924, and it had a major influence on 
training via its conferences and publications (Muddiman, 2005). How-
ever, there seems to be little evidence of any interest in such training as 
preparation for work in the Registry or Government Code and Cypher 
School, probably because these organizations would have followed civil 
service procedures and depended on general in-service training. 
While mathematicians and crossword puzzle enthusiasts were recruited 
for cryptology, and linguists were sought for translation and the watch, 
none was recruited expressly for his or her experience in documentation. 
Joyce Thomas, a part-time librarian while a languages undergraduate at 
Durham, was recruited for her German, and no interest was shown in her 
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other strength.44 Cullingham, later to be the founder of the Air Index 
itself (as opposed to the organizational unit the AIR INDEX), was more 
likely to have been recruited for his fluency in German gained as Hamburg 
representative of Kelly’s Directories than for his expertise in indexing.45
When de Grey grasped the need for indexers to handle the increasing 
amounts of Ultra, he found only two members of the unit familiar with 
card indexing (and it is conceivable that he was one of them).46 He ob-
served that there was difficulty in trying to find people to keep the Index 
current; it seemed not to occur to him that the resources offered by the 
civilian indexing community might have been tapped. All this was despite 
the fact that a memorandum by one MI5 officer, Captain Holroyd, clearly 
indicated the need for lessons in indexing to be learned from the experi-
ences of the First World War.47
Not only did the indexers train themselves but also the newly appointed 
advisers (Howard, 1987) who invariably, at the start, were drawn from the 
universities and who, while in many cases of high academic standing, were 
understandably clueless about the military matters. 
The indexers were recognized as fulfilling valuable roles additional to 
the (presumed at the time) lowly clerical duties associated with carding—
and they were acknowledged to be crucial in the intelligence operation.48 
Plainly this contribution was viewed as valuable as it led to what was re-
garded as promotion—thus for example, Jean Alington was moved from 
the Air Index to a key coordinating unit 3 L (Hut 3 Liaison). Military 
indexers were also promoted away from the Index to posts more conven-
tionally regarded as intelligence work;49 and in Naval Section, Sarah Nor-
ton was promoted first to translation and then to the Naval Intelligence 
Division in the Admiralty in London (Baring, 2000; Smith, 1998, p. 115). 
DN of the Air Index recounted that as head of the Index, she constantly 
lost her indexers as they were moved to other work considered more 
“intelligence”-focused.50 
Effectiveness
There is no doubting the effectiveness of all these information retrieval 
machines in meeting the needs of their customers. Generous is the testi-
mony to their efficiency in supplying the required intelligence in a timely 
fashion to case officers, intelligence analysts, and research parties in both 
MI5 and SIS. The historical reports produced by H branch after the First 
World War recount in considerable detail the ways in which the women of 
the Registry supported their intelligence officers and include the recipi-
ents of letters of commendation and honors bestowed in recognition of 
work well done.51
Sir Dick White (the only person to have directed both MI5 and SIS) 
wrote in highly complimentary terms about the performance of the Infor-
mation Index in facilitating the work of the LRC. Its effectiveness was de-
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scribed in the following terms: “The outstanding importance of the Infor-
mation Index arose from the fact that it made all this information readily 
accessible; and the skill, care and thought with which it was compiled was 
a remarkable achievement.”52 The very minute and eclectic information 
gathered purposefully by LRC for its Information Index proved highly 
effective. Compared with the Central Registry and other indexes (limited 
in that they could give information only on specific names and addresses) 
the LRC Information Index could use vague indications such as Christian 
names or unnumbered addresses in a particular street in some town.53 
33,000 aliens passed through LRC, and as far as is known, only three enemy 
agents with missions got through without detection (Curry, 1999, p. 227).
Many are the positive comments on the value of the indexes in Bletch-
ley Park in the historical memoranda and other contemporary sources. 
Perhaps the strongest, though, are the understated observations of people 
such as Bennett (1989), Calvocoressi (1981), and Lewin (1978)—as well 
as others, such as by Edward Thomas who observed that Professor Nor-
man did not receive due recognition for his index from Jones (Hinsley 
and Stripp, 1993, p. 44)—that testify to the importance of the documen-
tation system in the prosecution of the war. And the strongest of all, per-
haps, is the deafening silence in the major studies of intelligence in the 
Second World War: failing to acknowledge the indexes’ role effectively 
indicates their value in just being there when needed—had they been less 
so there might well have been produced more (and adverse) comment.
The evidence here presented justifies the hypothesis that to a great 
extent the intelligence officer of whatever grade or status discharged the 
functions of information officers or information scientists. Black and 
Hoare (2006) and Black, Muddiman, and Plant (2007) have written about 
“hidden libraries,” and this term might well be applied to the units that 
managed military intelligence in the first half of the twentieth century. 
If this is accepted, then how else might their staff be described than as 
“special librarians”; or, as members of Aslib would have it, “information 
officers”; or, as the Institute of Information Scientists would prefer, “infor-
mation scientists”?
Conclusions
With the advantages of hindsight and the perspective of library and infor-
mation science, it is easy to see that the workers in the military intelligence 
units discharged the functions of information officers. It was true at ev-
ery level: commissioned intelligence officers such as Calvocoressi; registry 
clerks; MI5 registry secretaries; Bletchley Park intelligence staff—all were 
involved in the accumulation of information, its organization for later re-
trieval, and the extraction and assembling of discrete pieces of informa-
tion from diverse sources to facilitate the development of the fuller story.
What emerges, though, is a picture of uninformed groping toward ap-
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propriate and efficient information management systems, which often 
entailed reaction to, rather than control of, information management 
problems as they cropped up. Thus we find the lack in the MI5 central 
Registry of a systematic approach felt to be necessary if the information 
system was to function efficiently,54 as will we find the fluid nature of the 
Air Index and Naval Section Index, where parts of the indexes could be 
hived off to others.
While Holroyd made recommendations that guidance might be taken 
from practices in the likes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica and the London 
Library,55 we find that by the outbreak of war in 1939, none of the lessons 
of the First World War seems to have been applied. Evidence in the Curry 
report (1999) produced at the end of the Second World War testifies to 
this for MI5; and observations such as those of de Grey in his manuscript 
memoirs speak to the same for Naval intelligence.56 When GCCS suddenly 
was faced with the problems brought about by the success of breaking 
Enigma (Welchman, 1982, pp. 93–94), it was only then realized that a 
documentation system was going to be needed to capitalize on the fruits 
of decryption.
Nonetheless, what systems did emerge proved crucially effective in 
their different contexts, and while it might be argued that drawing on 
civilian indexing practice as it had developed in the special library and 
information bureau sector might have prepared both the security service 
and SIS for that particular aspect of their work, it has been argued else-
where (Brunt, 2005) that the peculiar circumstances and contexts meant 
that only the homemade and flexible methods developed in their closed 
systems could have met the challenges their parent organizations had to 
face. 
Notes
  1.  MI5 was concerned with counterintelligence at home, SIS (MI6) with external security 
matters.
  2.  Ultra was the designation given to high-grade intelligence, specifically that gained by 
breaking messages encrypted by Enigma.
  3.  For consideration of the first two of these in a wider context, see Black, A. and R. Brunt 
(2000).
  4.  National Archives. KV1/53 annexure 1. Notes on the general organisation of a counter espionage 
bureau.
  5.  National Archives. KV1/53 annexure 8. Notes on records, methods of filing and registration.
  6.  National Archives. KV4/1-3. History of the security service: Its problems and organisational 
adjustments. 1944–46. 
  7.  National Archives. KV4/2 .History of the security service: Its problems and organisational adjust-
ments 1941–1945 and arrangements for its compilation, 1944–1946. Vol. 2, p. 202.
  8.  The Enigma machine, used by German naval, army, air force, and other organizations to 
encipher and decipher messages, was patented by Scherbius in 1919 as a security device 
for commercial communications (Hinsley and Stripp, 1993, p. 83).
  9.  While these designations were based on their original locations, the sections housed in 
them retained the identities after they had been moved into other buildings, thus “Hut 
3” remained the label for air and military intelligence after relocation to “Block D,” and 
“Hut 4” remained that for naval intelligence even after its relocation to “Block A.” 
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10.  Aslib (Association for Information Management) defines information management thus: 
“an imprecise term covering the various stages of information processing from production 
to storage and retrieval to dissemination towards the better working of an organization; 
information can be from internal and external sources and in any format.” Retrieved 
February 19, 2013, from http:/ /www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/csc-ccs/pdf/phis/phis %20pro 
duct_plan_v4.pdf 
11.  Paradoxically, Leamas found refuge as a library assistant.
12.  Correspondence from DN, 2002; and from the mass of reminiscences, e.g., Hill (2004).
13.  It is likely that Pinto worked for LRC and his prodigious memory was in fact the Informa-
tion Index of that organization. His memory is described in “With My Little Eye” (1952).
14.  Order of Battle (OB) was the structure of military forces showing formations and strengths 
and could include non-combatant units.
15.  National Archives. KV4/2. History of the Security Service. Vol. 2, p. 202. 
16.  National Archives. HW3/120. The history of Hut 3. Vol. 2, p.436.
17.  National Archives. HW3/137. The history of N.S. VI (Technical Intelligence) (Naval Section 
historical memorandum no. 33.
18.  National Archives. KV1/50. H Branch report. First supplement. Report on women’s work, §63.
19.  Ibid., §55.
20.  Ibid., §63.
21.  National Archives. KV4/7. London Reception Centre. Chap. 2, p. 10.
22.  National Archives. KV1/53 annexure 8. Notes on records.
23.  Ibid.
24.  Ibid.
25.  National Archives. KV4/7. London Reception Centre. Chap. 1, pp. 22–23.
26.  Interview with Joyce Thomas, 2002.
27.  National Archives. HW3/119. The history of Hut 3. Vol. 1, p. 166.
28.  National Archives. KV1/56. Organisation and administration: annexures; office instructions, 
1916, pp. 31–52.
29.  This resembles Berghöffer filing, devised for the Frankfurter Sammelkatalog, 1891, as 
modified for the Swiss Union Catalogue.
30.  National Archives. KV1/50. H Branch report. First supplement. Report on women’s work, §96.
31.  National Archives. KV 4/152. Arrangements of Security Service Central Indexes including carding 
and amending procedures.
32.  National Archives. KV1/50. H Branch report. First supplement. Report on women’s work, §96.
33.  Joyce Thomas (interviewed in 2002) described the process of establishing new cards or 
headings.
34.  National Archives. KV1/50. H Branch report. First supplement. Report on women’s work.
35.  Peenemunde was where the V1 was being developed.
36.  Correspondence from DN, 2002.
37.  National Archives. HW3/119. The history of Hut 3. Vol. 1, pp. 111, 118.
38.  National Archives KV1/50. H Branch report; National Archives HW3/119. The history of 
Hut 3. Vol. 1, pp. 111, 118.
39.  National Archives. HW3/119. The history of Hut 3. Vol. 1, p. 118.
40.  National Archives. HW3/119. The history of Hut 3. Vol. 1, pp. 111, 118, 166.
41.  National Archives. KV1/50. H Branch report. First supplement. Report on women’s work.
42.  That is, in Oxford and Cambridge, which did not admit women to degrees until after the 
Second World War.
43.  National Archives. HW3/119. The history of Hut 3. Vol. 1, p. 169.
44.  Interview with Joyce Thomas, 2002.
45.  Interview with P. Calvocoressi, 2001.
46.  National Archives. HW3/95. De Grey’s History of Air Sigint (Drafts): Chapter II, Sitz and Blitz: 
1939–1940, work of the Air Section and Huts 3 and 6 at BP, p. 106, pencilled marginalia.
47.  National Archives. KV1/53 Annexure 11. Suggested memo on subject-index [by Capt. Holroyd].
48.  National Archives. HW3/119. The history of Hut 3. Vol. 1, p. 118
49.  Ibid.
50.  Personal communication from DN, 2002.
51.  National Archives. KV1/50. H Branch report. First supplement. Report on women’s work, §83, 
85, 86, 96.
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52.  National Archives. KV 4/2. History of the Security Service. Vol. 2, p. 204.
53.  National Archives. KV4/7. Report on the operations of B1D and B1D-UK (London Reception 
Centre), p. 18.
54.  National Archives. HW3/120. The history of Hut 3. Vol. 2, p. 502; KV1/53 annexure 11. 
Suggested memo on subject – index. 
55.  National Archives. KV1/53 annexure 11. Suggested memo on subject – index. Evidence strongly 
suggests that Holroyd turned up in 3G (a section of Hut 3) running the Railway index 
having been in MI5 registry 1915–1920: see Richmond (2001).
56.  National Archives. HW8/21. Naval Miscellaneous Papers 1939. 
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